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RULE 8.3* AND THE EFFECT OF HIMMEL ON THE
PRACTICING ATTORNEY IN NORTH DAKOTA
JOHN J. GOSBEE**
WHAT IS A LAWYER TO Do? STIFLE THE CLIENT OR BLOW
THE WHISTLE?
When a Corvette driver ran a stop sign in October of 1978
and ran into Tammy Forsberg's motorcycle, he little realized that
his disregard for that sign would set into motion a course of events
that would lead one lawyer to steal $35,000 and see another law-
yer suspended from practice for one year.'
Forsberg retained attorney John R. Casey to represent her in
any personal injury or property damage claim that might result
from the accident.2 Casey negotiated a settlement agreement, but
later converted the entire $35,000 settlement.3 Forsberg spent
two years trying to recover her share of the settlement from Casey
before turning to another attorney, James Himmel, for help.4
Himmel investigated the matter and discovered that Casey had
indeed converted Forsberg's money. Himmel then negotiated an
* Distinctions between North Dakota Rule 8.3 and the ABA Model Rule are set out as
an appendix.
** B.A., Brandeis University, 1971. J.D., St. Mary's University, 1977. LL.M. (Taxation),
Boston University, 1981. Presently in the private practice of law in Mandan, North Dakota.
1. If the driver were a lawyer, he or she would no doubt have fun comparing this result
with that of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2. In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, -, 533 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1988) reh 'g denied January
30, 1989. See Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical
Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 977, 983 n.38 (1988)
[hereinafter Rotunda] (discusses Himmel in great depth).
3. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
4. Id. By the time she came to Himmel, Forsberg's own efforts had netted her $5,000
from Casey. Id. Thus, she was still seeking $18,233.33 when she came to Himmel. The
Illinois court describes Forsberg's share as $23,233.34. Id. Puzzling aspects of the opinion
include its contradictory descriptions of what Forsberg received and its confusing
description of the fee arrangement Himmel made with Forsberg. As to what Forsberg
collected, we are told that she "collected $5,000 from Casey" before retaining Himmel, and
that due to Himmel's efforts, "Forsberg collected another $10,400 from Casey." Id. at __,
533 N.E.2d at 791-92. That means Forsberg collected $15,400 in all. The court
commented, in determining what type of discipline to impose, that "we do consider the
fact that Forsberg recovered $10,400 through [Himmel's] services." Id. at __, 533 N.E.2d at
796. Yet, the court also stated that Himmel "requested no fee for recovering the
$23,233.34." Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 792. Does that mean he collected "the" $23,233.34?
As to what Himmel's fee was, we are told that it was to be "one-third of any funds
recovered above $23,233.34." Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 791. No explanation is offered as to
why Himmel agreed to take on the case with no fee until his client more than broke even.
She had already recovered $5,000.00, but Himmel wouldn't have been entitled to a fee
until he got what was, in effect, a second $5,000.00. Basically, Himmel took the case on a
pro bono basis, with any fees going to him only in the event of a lodestar recovery. If
Himmel was indeed intending to pursue the case on a pro bono basis or out of some sense of
loyalty to the profession and the desire to right a wrong wrought by one of its members, he
was certainly ill served for his efforts.
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agreement with Casey under which Casey would pay Forsberg
$75,000 in full settlement for all her claims against Casey and
would "not initiate any criminal, civil, or attorney disciplinary
action against Casey."5
Disciplinary proceedings were begun against Himmel in Janu-
ary of 1986 for Himmel's failure to report Casey's misconduct. At
the first level, the Hearing Board recommended a private repri-
mand.' The Administrator took the case to the Review Board,
which found that Himmel had not violated the rules and recom-
mended dismissal of the complaint.7 The Administrator then took
the case to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which found that Him-
mel had violated the rules by failing to report Casey's theft of For-
sberg's money and suspended Himmel for one year."
There is only one argument that the result in this case was
fair. That is that if Himmel had reported Casey, Casey might have
been caught and stopped sooner. Himmel willingly 9 engaged in a
cover-up of Casey's theft and, significantly, Casey went on stealing
for two more years before he was finally caught. 10
5. Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 791 (emphasis added). Although the agreement has the
appearance of "hush money," it could have represented a settlement of a possible
malpractice claim against Casey, since Forsberg "had $20,000 to $25,000 in medical bills
alone... [suggesting] that Casey probably settled Ms. Forsberg's personal injury claim too
cheaply." Rotunda, supra note 2, at 983 n.38. Another possibility is that $35,000 was the
policy limit, and the Corvette's driver was judgment-proof for any more. If that was the
case, Casey would not have been negligent in failing to get more, and the status of the extra
$40,000 as "hush money" for the theft would have been clear. Rotunda's analysis is that
Himmel "probably thought of the extra amount as akin to treble damages." Id. Rotunda
does not elaborate on his theory of why Forsberg would have been entitled to treble
damages, unless it was for the tort of conversion. For such a conversion in North Dakota,
Forsberg would have been entitled to her $18,233 plus the reasonable expense of
recovering her property. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-23(3) (1960) (setting out
damages for conversion of property). No doubt this would have included a reasonable
attorney's fee for Himmel.
6. Himmel, 125 Ill 2d at __, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
7. id.
8. Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 796.
9. He was contractually bound to do so, having drafted an agreement in which his
client "agreed not to initiate any criminal, civil, or attorney disciplinary action against
Casey." Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 791. The court noted that this was
probably, in itself, a criminal offense, compounding a crime in violation of Illinois law,
which prohibits receipt of "consideration for a promise not to prosecute...I. " Id. at -, 533
N.E.2d at 796 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977)). North Dakota
apparently doesn't have a similar prohibition, but the right to compromise a crime when
the injured party "has received satisfaction" is limited to misdemeanors. N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 29-01-16 to 17 (1991). Casey's misapplication of the $18,233 Forsberg entrusted to him
would be a Class B felony in North Dakota. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-07(2Xa) (Supp.
1989) (class B felony if property misapplied exceeds $10,000 in value).
10. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 795. Casey stole Tammy Forsberg's money
in March of 1981. Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 791. Forsberg first came to Himmel in March of
1983. Id. Based on misconduct with other clients' funds, disciplinary actions were not
started against Casey until April of 1985, twenty-five months after Himmel learned of
Casey's action. Id. The court stated that "Casey converted many clients' funds after
[Himmel's] duty to report Casey arose." Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 795.
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Nonetheless, there are disturbing aspects of the case which,
taken as a whole, suggest that Himmel was not fairly treated. 1
First of all, Himmel was suspended solely for failing to report the
misconduct of a lawyer previously involved in the case. Clearly no
"code of silence" should apply to the profession, 12 but sober con-
sideration must be given to the real-world situation Himmel was
required to deal with. For one thing, it is very likely that Himmel
was sailing off toward uncharted shoals in considering whether he
could face disciplinary action solely for his failure to report
Casey.' 3 Further, Himmel's client told him "she simply wanted
her money back and specifically instructed [Himmel] to take no
other action."' 4 Even in the absence of express instructions, Him-
mel may reasonably have believed he couldn't disclose what Fors-
berg told him without her permission to do so; namely, that
Forsberg's communication was privileged.
To justify punishing Himmel, the Illinois court had to drasti-
11. After all, the first two levels of disciplinary authority sided in whole or in part with
Himmel, recommending reprimand or a dismissal.
12. The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated that a code of silence doesn't apply to the
profession. In re Anglin, 122 IUI. 2d 531, -., 524 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1988). Anglin shows that
truth is indeed stranger than fiction-it certainly would have made a great Untouchables
episode. In 1970, Anglin was suspended from the practice of law in Illinois for five years for
coningling client funds. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 551. In an unrelated matter, he was
convicted in federal court of possession of stolen securities. Id. While serving his time,
Anglin was subpoenaed and asked to identify his coconspirators in the securities scam. Id.
at -, 524 N.E.2d at 552. For his refusal to answer, he served another 18 months. Id. His
1970 suspension having been turned into a consensual disbarment in 1974, Anglin
eventually applied for reinstatement in 1984, at which time he still refused to identify his
coconspirators from the old stock scam. Id. Even after all that, the hearing panel and
review board both recommended reinstatement. Id. at __, 524 N.E.2d at 554. The
Supreme Court of Illinois said no, holding that because Anglin -'continues to express a belief
in a code of personal conduct that is inconsistent with a portion of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, we are not convinced that he has been fully rehabilitated .... " Id. at __, 524
N.E.2d at 555. The court alluded to the same Disciplinary Rules it would soon refer to in
Himmel: DR 1-103 and DR 1-102(aX3) to (4). Id. at -, 524 N.E.2d at 554. Four months
later, the court cited Anglin in Himmel's case. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 793-
94. Importantly, for this discussion, Anglin shows that a "code of silence" is indefensible.
13. Apparently the issue of failure to report a fellow lawyer's misconduct was, as a
practical matter, a novel one:
If we look through all of the courts of this land, it is virtually unheard of to
find a case where a lawyer is disciplined merely for refusing to report another
lawyer.... In those cases where the lawyer was disciplined for failing to report
another lawyer, the failure to report was merely one of several discipline
violations, with the bar authorities or the court throwing in the failure to report
as one violation among many. That is, until Himmel.
Rotunda, supra note 2, at 982.
14. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at __, 533 N.E.2d at 792. The court gave short shrift to
Himmel's argument that the client's request excused his failure to report Casey. "A lawyer
may not choose to circumvent the rules by simply asserting that his client asked him to do
so." Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 793. That argument sounds quite appealing and sensible, and
maybe Himmel did go over the line. After all, he and his client contractually agreed not to
expose Casey, thereby freeing Casey to go about his nefarious ways. Forsberg's pact with
the devil turned out not to be all that rewarding to her after all. As previously noted in note
4, supra, she only recovered $15,400.
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cally shrink the ethical attorney-client privilege. The court held
that "information voluntarily disclosed by a client to an attorney,
in the presence of third parties who are not agents of the client or
attorney, is not privileged .... "15 In support of its conclusion, the
court cited the fact that Forsberg's mother and fiance were pres-
ent when she told her tale of woe to Himmel."6 The loss of that
privilege may be more serious to the profession than the damage
done by a few Caseys. It may require lawyers to stifle their clients'
rendition of the facts of a case, or to at least make sure there are no
witnesses to the rendition.
True, Forsberg's mother and fiance might not have been her
agents in the formal sense, but they no doubt came along for moral
support. After all, Forsberg had suffered not only the indignity of
being injured in a motorcycle accident, but the added insult of
being fleeced by someone she had trusted. Having been tricked
by one lawyer whom she presumably trusted at the outset, Fors-
berg certainly was not imprudent in bringing her mother and
fiance along, either for moral support or as witnesses in case some-
thing went wrong again. What would have happened if Himmel
had turned out to be unreliable? If the Illinois Supreme Court's
standard is to apply, then the only way lawyers can safely protect
client confidences is to either throw out of the office all persons
who accompany the client or draw up a document appointing
them as agents of the client.
The court also held that because the client allowed Himmel to
talk about "Casey's conversion of her funds with the insurance
company involved, the insurance company's lawyer, and with
Casey himself... the information was not privileged. 1 7 How else
could Himmel have handled the case? How could he have
avoided potential liability for a Rule 11 violation?"'
What if Forsberg had her facts wrong? Himmel at least had to
check with the insurance company to see if the claim had been
paid. He was certainly prudent in checking with Casey to hear his
side of the story. What would have happened if Casey had said,
"What are you talking about? I paid her. Here's a copy of the
check from my trust account!" If it had turned out that Forsberg
had lied to him, and Himmel hadn't done at least that much
15. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 794 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. Id. at __, 533 N.E.2d at 794.
18. Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure requires pleadings to be filed
in good faith after appropriate investigation. N.D.R. Civ. P. 11.
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checking, a justifiably miffed Casey could have brought a motion
for Rule 11 sanctions against Himmel.
What the Illinois Supreme Court has done is take two per-
fectly sensible courses of conduct (allowing the client to talk in the
presence of friends and investigating the case) and turn them into
a destruction of the ethical attorney-client privilege. This is apply-
ing bad logic to achieve a result the court desired.
It is difficult to predict what will result in North Dakota, and
what effect Himmel will have on our practicing attorneys. The
case is probably useful in at least making the issue open for discus-
sion. We certainly now know that, in some jurisdictions at least, a
strict construction is placed on the whistle-blowing rule.' 9
In one sense, Himmel might stand as persuasive authority in
North Dakota, and in another sense it might not. It could be con-
sidered persuasive for its definition of the kind of misconduct that
19. Himmel has already had some salutary effects. Not surprisingly, in Illinois there
was an increase of reporting of misconduct by other lawyers. Rotunda, supra note 2, at 992,
n.69. In another case, an Arizona public defender reported a prosecutor for a conflict of
interest violation, when the prosecutor handled a case against a fourth and fifth-time DUI
offender whom he had previously defended as a contract public defender. In re Ockrassa,
165 Ariz. 576,799 P.2d 1350 (1990). The new public defender asked Ockrassa to withdraw,
but he refused to do so, and later "the trial judge advised the [new] deputy public defender
that he had an ethical obligation to report perceived violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct to the State Bar." Id. at 1350-51.
No doubt many lawyers may view Rule 8.3 as requiring them to report misconduct of
opposing counsel during the conduct of litigation (e.g., N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rules 3.1-3.9, dealing with the lawyer's conduct as an advocate). Although such a
report might very well be justified, it would be tainted with the suspicion that
dissatisfaction with the results of a case was the motivation. One commentator has noted
that "74 percent of docketed grievances filed by lawyers against their adversaries are
eventually dismissed." Mitchem, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Ethical Violations, 18 COLO.
LAWYER 1915, 1916 (1989). There are special pitfalls in making the report while a case is
ongoing. As Rotunda notes, if the report is made at that point in time, the reported lawyer
can "immediately retaliate by claiming that the [reporting lawyer] is 'abusing' the
[disciplinary] procedures to apply 'improper pressure' on the allegedly wayward attorney."
Rotunda, supra note 2, at 992-93.
In a result he describes as "perverse," Rotunda notes that in Illinois the existence of the
civil action against the offending attorney can abate the disciplinary action. Id. at 993. One
egregious example cited by Rotunda involved a lawyer who was sued by an insurance
company for fraud in a federal case that went all the way to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which, in a panel opinion, stated that it was "astonished to learn" that disciplinary
proceedings had never yet been started against the lawyer. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377, 385 (1988). The court then emphasized that it
would mail a copy of the opinion to the Illinois disciplinary authorities. Id. Rotunda
followed up on the matter, and, as far as he could tell, no action had been taken some 14
months later. Rotunda, supra note 2, at 994-95.
In the context of this analysis, if the disciplinary proceedings were abated during the
existence of a civil action against Casey, it wouldn't have made any difference that Himmel
didn't report Casey's misconduct. However, no civil action was brought against Casey until
he failed to pay the $75,000, as agreed to in 1983. Himmel, 125 I11. 2d at __, 533 N.E.2d at
791. In 1985, Himmel brought suit against Casey and obtained a $100,000 judgment. Id.
In North Dakota, disciplinary proceedings are not abated because of the existence of
pending civil litigation against the lawyer "unless the [Disciplinary Board] in its discretion
authorizes a stay for good cause shown." N.D. PROCEDURAL RULES FOR LAWYER
DISABILITY AND DISCIPLINE Rule 3.5 (G) (1988).
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creates a duty to report. That possible persuasiveness is probably
outweighed, however, by the distinction the case makes between
the evidentiary attorney-client privilege and the ethical attorney-
client privilege. It appears that, in North Dakota, the ethical privi-
lege would take precedence.
Although Himmel was based not on Rule 8.3, but on Discipli-
nary Rule 1-103,2o on the issue of the kinds of misconduct that
should be reported, the Illinois version of DR 1-103 was more
closely analogous to both states' version of Rule 8.3 than to North
Dakota's (and the model's) version of DR 1-103."1 However, that
comparison alone does not decide the issue.
As previously noted, a major reason the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled against Himmel was that it applied the narrower evi-
dentiary definition of the attorney-client privilege instead of the
broader ethical definition.22  Given that distinction and the lan-
guage of both the model version and North Dakota's version of
20. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 790-91. Some commentators distinguish
between the two, holding that DR 1-103, with its reference to reporting violations of DR 1-
102, "trigger[s] the reporting obligation, even if the violation is of a trivial nature." Olsson,
Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service to Ethical Standards is Not Enough, 31 ARIz. L.
REV. 657, 663 (1989) (citing C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 685 (1986)). In
contrast, Model Rule 8.3 requires only the reporting of "substantial" violations, which are
defined in the comment to the rule as those serious enough "that a self-regulating
profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1989). The comment also states that "substantial" does not
refer to the quantum of evidence. Id. The distinction has no application to Himmel,
because no matter how you slice it, what Casey did was substantial. Justification for
Himmel's conduct is found in the attorney-client privilege. See infra notes 22-28 and
accompanying text.
21. Model DR 1-103 requires reporting of all "unprivileged knowledge of a violation of
DR 1-102." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1969). Model DR
1-102(A) prohibits six forms of misconduct: (1) violation of a Disciplinary Rule; (2)
circumvention of a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another; (3) engaging in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude; (4) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation; (5) engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice; and (6) engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
1-102(A) (1969). Illinois adopted only the first five subdivisions. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
DR 1-102(A) (Smith-Hurd 1980). North Dakota adopted all six. N.D. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLr-Y DR 1-102 (1981).
However, the Illinois version of DR 1-103 required only the reporting of violations of
DR 1-102(AX3) and (4). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, DR 1-103 (Smith-Hurd 1980). Therefore,
Illinois presaged the change made in Model Rule 8.3 by making mandatory reporting apply
only to serious violations.
22. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 790 (1988) (citing People v. Williams, 97 I1.
2d 252, 454 N.E.2d 220 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 981 (1984)).
The rationale [in Himmel ] is that the court interprets 'privilege,' as it is used
in Rule 1-103(a), to include only the evidentiary attorney-client privilege. By
excluding the ethical privilege, which is broader than the evidentiary privilege,
the court has offered no protection to information that would be classified as a
secret' under Rule 4-101(a).
Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Misconduct, 14 S. ILL. U. L. J. 683,
690 (1990) (italics in original, underscore added, and footnotes omitted).
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Rule 8.3(c), the case may not be persuasive authority in North
Dakota. The model version specifically "does not require disclo-
sure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."23
The distinction is that Rule 1.6 is client-focused, not evidence-
focused. Rule 1.6 prohibits the revelation of "information relating
to representation of a client unless the client consents after consul-
tation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b)."'24 This provision resolves both points raised by the court on
this subject. Forsberg told Himmel she didn't want the informa-
tion disclosed, so that takes care of .the issue of her mother and
fiance being there when she told Himmel. Obviously, Himmel's
discussions of the matter with the insurer and Casey were
"impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,"
thus taking care of that issue.25
The North Dakota version of Rule 1.6 is somewhat different,
requiring the disclosure when death or substantial bodily harm is
imminent, 26 and permitting it when necessary "to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that.., is likely
to result in. . . substantial injury or harm to the financial interests
or property of another. ' 2' No such consequence would have
arisen from failing to report Casey, so it appears that, by operation
of North Dakota's Rule 1.6(d), Himmel's conduct would not violate
North Dakota's Rule 8.3.'
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (1981) (emphasis added).
The Illinois provision requires reporting of information "not otherwise protected as a
confidence under these Rules .... ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990). The North Dakota provision is identical to
the model provision, except for the omission of the word "otherwise." N.D. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 8.3(c) (1988).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1981) (emphasis added).
Paragraph (b) permits disclosure to prevent the client from committing a criminal act likely
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, or to deal with disputes with the
client. Id. at 1.6(b). Therefore, even the Illinois Supreme Court's argument that Forsberg's
conduct was probably the crime of compounding a crime wouldn't require disclosure, as
imminent death or substantial bodily harm would not have resulted. See Himmel, 125 InI.
2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 796.
25. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (lawyer may reveal
such disclosures).
26. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1988).
27. Id. at 1.6(d).
28. The same reasoning probably wouldn't apply in Illinois. Illinois has yet another
variation on Rule 1.6, probably crafted with the Himnel precedent in mind, allowing the
lawyer to reveal: "(1) confidences or secrets when permitted under these Rules or required
by law or court order; (2) the intention of a client to commit a crime in circumstances other
than [one resulting in death or serious bodily harm, for which reporting is required] .... "
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990) (emphasis added). One might argue that, unless he was ordered to do so, Himmel
would not have to reveal Casey's conduct under the Illinois version of Rule 1.6. However,
the counter argument would be that Rule 1.6(cX1) allows revelation when "permitted"
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So, we have two comparisons to make in evaluating Himmel's
impact on the practicing North Dakota attorney. On the one
hand, there is the argument that the Illinois version of DR 1-103 is
sufficiently similar to North Dakota's Rule 8.3 to justify applying
Himmel to our rule. On the other hand, there is the argument
that the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on the evidentiary ver-
sion of the attorney-client privilege, rather than the ethical version
of that privilege, erodes any persuasive authority of Himmel.
The second argument appears much stronger, and certainly
the ethical version of the attorney-client privilege is the one that
we, as lawyers, should adhere to, leaving it to our clients to waive
the evidentiary one when they wish.2 9 Therefore, the impact of
Himmel on practicing North Dakota lawyers is probably limited to
its educational impact; namely, that the duty to report misconduct
can arise as an obligation independent of our efforts to otherwise
comply with the rules that guide our profession.
under these rules (which would include rule 8.3) or "required by law," which would
presumably include the case law established in Himmel.
That there is a difference from Model Rule 1.6 in Illinois is recognized in that state:
[N]ew Illinois Rule 8.3(a) is not significantly different from old Rule 1-103(a).
Rule 8.3(a) is essentially the same except that instead of "unprivileged"
knowledge, the knowledge that must be reported is that which is "not otherwise
protected as a confidence by these Rules or by law....
These changes do not alter the practical effect of the duty to report because
attorneys will experience difficulty interpreting the requirements of the new
rule. For example, a lawyer must now determine whether 'applicable law'
protects the knowledge as a 'confidence,' and what applicable law is, or
determine whether the confidence is 'otherwise protected' by the rules. These
problems demonstrate the need for better guidelines to assist lawyers in
determining what knowledge must be reported and the scope of the attorney-
client privilege.
The ABA Model Rules offer a potential solution to the problem of defining
knowledge, while simultaneously providing guidance to lawyers in these
situations .... [Tihe attorney-client privilege in ABA Rule 1.6 protects more
knowledge and information than the court's definition of the privilege under the
Illinois Rules.
Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Misconduct, 14 S. ILL. U. L. J. 683,
694-5 (1990) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
29. The evidentiary privilege is claimed by the client, and the lawyer "is presumed to
have the authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client." N.D.R. EVID.
502(c).
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APPENDIX
DISTINCTIONS30 BETWEEN NORTH DAKOTA RULE 8.3 AND THE
ABA MODEL RULE
IRULE 8.3 RepOrtmg Prof4s@io..nAl .4.ppiscon"duct 3 1
RULE 8.3. Reporting professional misconduct.
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has com-
mitted a violation of the these32 Rules of Profe--n-A Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustwor-
thiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform-the
appropriate professio nal authorf.ity initiate proceedings under the
North Dakota Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a
violation of apphc-able rules of judical conduct the North Dakota
Rules of Judicial Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the
judge's honesty, trustworthiness, or3 3 fitness for judicial office shall
infeFom the appropriate authorit), initiate proceedings under the
Rules of the North Dakota Judicial Conduct Commission.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information ether-
wise protected by Rule 1.6.
Comment
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members
of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they
know of a violation of the Rulc-S of Professional Cendu--ct these
Rules.3 4 Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial
misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pat-
tern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can
uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the
victim is unlikely to discover the offense.
A report about misconduct is not required where it making
30. Model language deleted in North Dakota version shown by e, vertrike; language
added by North Dakota version shown underscored.
31. Differences in centering and bold-tacing are based on comparison between ABA
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3, at 346-47 (1984) and the
Rules as published in the Michie Company version, pp. 905-06 (1990).
32. Except as noted in note 34, infra, the changes were made to "conform Rule 8.3 to
North Dakota Law." Minutes of Professional Conduct Subcommittee, Attorney Standards
Committee, North Dakota Bar Association, December 13, 1985, at 10.
33. Added at the suggestion of Randy Lee, member of the subcommittee, "to apply the
same standard to lawyers. . .and judges." Id.
34. The reasoning behind most of the variations from the Model's comment can be
gleaned from the context. However, no explanation is provided for any of the variations.
Minutes, supra note 32, January 31, 1986, at 13.
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the report would involve violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer
excused from reporting a violation on that ground should
encourage a the client to consent to disclosure where prosecution
would not substantially prejudice the client's interests.
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the these
Rules, the failure to report any -viaR even technical or insub-
stantial violations would itself be a professional effene. Such a
requremet existed in Many jurisdietiens but proved to be unen
f-f-eable violation of these Rules. This Rule limits the reporting
obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must
vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is, there-
fore, required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The
tefm Whether a violation is "substantial" refero depends on the
seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evi-
dence of which the lawyer is aware. A report she-ld be made to
the b-ar disciplinary agoncy unless so-me other agency, sueh as a
perreiwagency) is more apprFopriate in the c-43irumstances.
Similar considerations apply to the reporting of judicial
misconduct.
The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to
a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional con-
duct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the-Riales rules
applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.
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